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Abstract
We develop a novel framework that aims
to create bridges between the computational
social choice and the database management
communities. This framework enriches the
tasks currently supported in computational
social choice with relational database context,
thus making it possible to formulate sophisti-
cated queries about voting rules, candidates,
voters, issues, and positions. At the con-
ceptual level, we give rigorous semantics to
queries in this framework by introducing the
notions of necessary answers and possible an-
swers to queries. At the technical level, we em-
bark on an investigation of the computational
complexity of the necessary answers. We es-
tablish a number of results about the com-
plexity of the necessary answers of conjunctive
queries involving positional scoring rules that
contrast sharply with earlier results about the
complexity of the necessary winners.
1 Introduction
Social choice theory is concerned with the aggregation
of preferences expressed by the members of a society
to arrive at a collective decision. The origins of so-
cial choice theory are often traced to the work of Jean-
Charles de Borda andMarquis de Condorcet in the 18th
Century, even though it is now known that Condorcet’s
voting rule had been already proposed by Ramon Llull
in the 13th Century [8]. During the past two decades,
social choice theory has been examined under the al-
gorithmic lens, and computational social choice (COM-
SOC) has emerged as an interdisciplinary research area
that combines insights and methods from mathemat-
ics, economics, logic, and computer science. The COM-
SOC community has carried out an in-depth investiga-
tion of computational aspects of voting and preference
aggregation in an election or a poll. Since preferences
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are often only partially expressed, the notions of nec-
essary winners and possible winners were formulated by
Konczak and Lang [14], as the candidates who win in
every (respectively, in at least one) completion of the
given partial preferences. Subsequent investigations
produced a classification of the computational complex-
ity of the necessary and possible winners for a variety
of voting rules [3; 4; 21].
Here, we bring forth a novel framework that aims
to create bridges between the COMSOC community
and the data management community. We enrich the
kinds of data analysis tasks that COMSOC methods
currently support by incorporating context about can-
didates, voters, issues, and positions, thus going well
beyond the mere determination of winners. To achieve
this, we accommodate COMSOCprimitives within a re-
lational database framework, enabling the formulation
and evaluation of sophisticated queries.
Motivating Example. A preference database [10] is de-
picted in Figure 1. The relations CAND and VOTER
contain demographic information about political candi-
dates and voters, while SUPPORTS and OPPOSES list po-
sitions of candidates on campaign issues, and BALLOT
records results of an election or a poll. Observe that
BALLOT specifies preferences of a voter in an election
with pairwise comparisons: the meaning of the tu-
ple (Oct-5,Ann;Clinton,Trump) is that voter Ann
prefers Clinton to Trump when polled on October 5.
Preferences of voters may be incomplete. In particu-
lar, Ann states that she prefers both Clinton and John-
son to Trump, but does not specify a relative preference
between Clinton and Johnson. The incomplete prefer-
ence relation BALLOT gives rise to four completions, B1
through B4, in which each session is associated with
a complete ranking (a total order) over the candidates
that is consistent with the partial preference in BALLOT.
A data analyst may want to aggregate the votes of
Ann and Bob to determine the winner of the Oct-5
election—the candidate deemed most desirable by the
voters—using a voting rule. In this paper, we focus on
positional scoring rules—voting rules that assign a score
to each candidate based on the candidate’s position in a
ranking and then sum the scores across all rankings.
Our example involves two voting rules: plurality,
which assigns a score of 1 to the top candidate in each
ranking and 0 to all other candidates, and Borda, which
assigns a score of m − r to the candidate at position r
out of m. The sum of scores of each candidate in each
completion is shown in the bottom left table in Figure 1.
We are concerned with answering the following kind
of question: Is there a winner according to the plurality rule
in the October 5 election who is pro-choice? This question
is phrased in logic-rule style below as:
q1() :−WINNER(plurality,Oct-5, c),
SUPPORTS(c,pro-choice)
What is the meaning of such a query posed on a
database with partial preferences? In Section 3, we pro-
pose formal semantics that generalizes the concepts of
necessary and possible winners from computational social
choice to those of necessary and possible answers in a par-
tial preference database.
Returning to the example in Figure 1, if we consider
Borda’s rule, Clinton is the only necessary winner: she
is the sole winner in B1, B2 and B3, and is among the
winners in B4. If we consider the plurality rule, we find
the following winners in each completion: B1: Clinton,
B2: Clinton and Trump, B3: Clinton and Johnson, B4:
Johnson and Trump. Consequently, the set of neces-
sary winners under plurality is empty. Observe that,
although no candidate is a necessary winner under plu-
rality, it is the case that at least one of the winners in
each completion is pro-choice. Thus, under the plural-
ity rule, the query q1 is necessary, i.e., true is a necessary
answer of q1.
The preceding example illustrates the difference that
context makes and points to the richness brought by
combining social choice and data management.
Contributions. At the conceptual level, we develop a
framework that combines social choice with database
management, thus making it possible to study social
choice problems in the context of additional informa-
tion about voters, candidates, and issues. In particular,
we give rigorous semantics to queries in this framework
by introducing the notions of the necessary answers and
the possible answers. At the technical level, we embark
on an investigation of the computational complexity of
query evaluation in this framework. In particular, we
establish a number of results about the necessary an-
swers of queries that stand in sharp contrast to results
about the necessary winners under positional scoring
rules.
We begin by exploring the complexity of computing
the necessary answers under the plurality rule. It is well
known that there is a polynomial-time algorithm for
computing the necessary winners under the plurality
rule, and in fact, such an algorithm exists for every pure
positional scoring rule [14; 21]. We give a polynomial-
time algorithm for computing the necessary answers of
conjunctive queries that involve the plurality rule and
have the property that the winner atoms belong to dif-
ferent connected components of the query. We prove
that for a large class of conjunctive queries, the prop-
erty that winner atoms belong to different connected
components is precisely the property that distinguishes
tractable from intractable queries under the plurality
rule; particularly, evaluating queries in that class with
two winner atoms in the same connected component is
coNP-complete.
Going beyond the plurality rule, we show that there
is a natural conjunctive query involving database rela-
tions and winners such that computing the necessary
answers is a coNP-complete problem for all nontriv-
ial positional scoring rules. By trivial we mean a scor-
ing rule that assigns the same score to every candidate
(hence, every candidate is a necessary winner). This re-
sult subsumes the corresponding results (Theorems 4
and 5) that we have published in the abridged version
of this paper [12].
2 Preliminaries
Relational databases and conjunctive queries. A
schema is a collection of relation symbols, each having
an associated signature, which is a sequence of attribute
names. A database instantiates each relation symbol
with a corresponding relation (table). We will use the
database in Figure 1 as our running example.
A query is a function that maps every database into a
relation. More formally, a query has an associated in-
put schema and an output signature, and it maps every
database over the input schema into a relation over the
output signature. If D is a database and q is a query,
then q(D) denotes the relation resulting by evaluating q
on D; each tuple in q(D) is referred to as an answer to q
on D. In this paper, we study conjunctive queries, which
correspond to the fragment of first-order logic obtained
from atomic formulas using conjunction and existen-
tial quantification. Conjunctive queries are also known
as select-project-join (SPJ) queries, and are among the
most frequently asked database queries.
We will write queries as logic rules with a body and
a head. For example, consider the following query:
q(c) :− VOTER(Ann, s, e), CAND(c, p, s, a), a > 65
This query computes candidates who are older than
65 and whose sex is the same as that of voter Ann, and
will return a single tuple, Clinton, when evaluated
over the database in Figure 1. Note that Ann and 65
are constants in q, while a, c, e, p, and s are variables.
The variables e, p, s that occur in the body, but not in the
head, of the query are existentially quantified.
A Boolean query is a query that has no free variables,
hence it stands for a yes/no (true/false) question about
the database. For example, the Boolean query
q′() :− VOTER(Ann, s, e), CAND(c, p, s, a), a > 65
asks whether or not there is a candidate who is older
than 65 and whose sex is the same as that of voter Ann.
Conjunctive query evaluation has been a central topic
of research in the database management community
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CAND
cand party sex edu age
Clinton D F JD 70
Johnson L M BS 64
Trump R M BS 71
SUPPORTS
cand issue
Clinton gun-control
Clinton pro-choice
Johnson pro-choice
OPPOSES
cand issue
Johnson gun-control
Trump gun-control
Trump pro-choice
VOTER
voter sex edu
Ann F MS
Bob M BS
BALLOT
election voter lcand rcand
Oct-5 Ann Clinton Trump
Oct-5 Ann Johnson Trump
Oct-5 Bob Clinton Johnson
Oct-5 Bob Trump Johnson
B1 B2 B3 B4
cand pl Brd pl Brd pl Brd pl Brd
Clinton 2 4 1 3 1 3 0 2
Johnson 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 2
Trump 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 2
Candidate scores in the possible completions under the
plurality (pl) and Borda (Brd) rules
A possible completion B1 of BALLOT
election voter ranking
Oct-5 Ann Clinton ≻ Johnson ≻ Trump
Oct-5 Bob Clinton ≻ Trump ≻ Johnson
A possible completion B2 of BALLOT
election voter ranking
Oct-5 Ann Clinton ≻ Johnson ≻ Trump
Oct-5 Bob Trump ≻ Clinton ≻ Johnson
A possible completion B3 of BALLOT
election voter ranking
Oct-5 Ann Johnson ≻ Clinton ≻ Trump
Oct-5 Bob Clinton ≻ Trump ≻ Johnson
A possible completion B4 of BALLOT
election voter ranking
Oct-5 Ann Johnson ≻ Clinton ≻ Trump
Oct-5 Bob Trump ≻ Clinton ≻ Johnson
Figure 1: An example of a preference database.
(see [1]). In particular, it is well known that, for every
fixed conjunctive query q, there is a polynomial-time al-
gorithm that, given a database D, computes q(D).
Incomplete databases and possible worlds. Various
notions of database incompleteness have been studied
in depth for several decades. Common to these is the
notion of possible worlds: these include the completions
of incomplete databases and the solutions in data ex-
change and data integration [7; 9; 15]. Query answer-
ing is a central challenge studied in these frameworks,
where the goal is to find the certain answers, i.e., the an-
swers obtained on every completion or on every solu-
tion. Additionally, a possible answer is an answer that is
obtained on at least one possible world. More formally,
if W denotes the set of possible worlds of the database
representation at hand, then the set of certain answers
to the query q is the intersection
⋂
D∈W q(D), while the
set of possible answers to q is the union
⋃
D∈W q(D).
Voting profiles and voting rules. Let C = {c1, . . . , cm}
be a set of candidates (or alternatives) and let V =
{v1, . . . , vn} be a set of voters. A complete voting profile
is a tuple T = (T1, . . . , Tn), where each Ti is a total or-
der of the set C of candidates representing the ranking
(preference) of voter vj on the candidates in C.
Positional scoring rules constitute a large and exten-
sively studied class of voting rules. Each positional
scoring rule on a set of m candidates is specified by
a scoring vector a = (a1, . . . , am) of non-negative in-
tegers, called the score values, such that a1 ≥ a2 ≥
. . . ≥ am. To avoid trivialities, we assume that there
are at least two different score values. Suppose that
T = (T1, . . . , Tn) is a total voting profile. The score
s(Ti, c) of a candidate c on Ti is the value as where s
is the position of candidate c in Ti. When the positional
scoring rule r is applied to T = (T1, . . . , Tn), it assigns
to each candidate c the sum ∑ni=1 s(Ti, c) as the score of
c. The set W(r,T) of the winners consists of the candi-
dates who achieved maximum score.
From now on, we focus on positional scoring rules
that are defined for every number m of candidates.
Thus, a positional scoring rule is an infinite sequence
a1, a2, . . . , am, . . . of scoring vectors such that each am
is a scoring vector of length m. Alternatively, a posi-
tional scoring rule is a function r that takes as argument
a pair (m, s) of positive integers with s ≤ m and re-
turns as value a non-negative integer r(m, s) such that
r(m, 1) ≥ r(m, 2) . . . ≥ r(m,m). We will also assume
that the function r is computable in polynomial time.
This implies that the winners can be computed in poly-
nomial time.
As examples, the plurality rule is given by the infinite
sequence of scoring vectors of the form (1, 0, . . . , 0), the
2-approval rule is given by the infinite sequence of scor-
ing vectors of the form (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0), and the Borda rule
is given by the infinite sequence of scoring vectors of
the form (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0).
Much on the literaturemakes the assumption that the
rules are also pure, which means that the scoring vector
am+1 of length (m+ 1) is obtained from the scoring vec-
tor am of length m by inserting a score in some position
of the scoring vector am, provided that the decreasing
order of score values is maintained. The plurality, 2-
approval and Borda rules are all pure.
Partial orders. A preference over a collection of items is
a linear order that ranks the items from the most to the
least preferred. Often, our knowledge about the prefer-
ence is only partial. Missing information in preferences
is commonly modeled using a partial order, that is, a
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relation that is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric,
but not necessarily total. A completion of a partial order
is a total order that extends that partial order. A partial
order may have exponentially many completions.
Partial voting profiles, necessary and possible win-
ners. A partial voting profile is a tuple P = (P1, . . . , Pn),
where each Pi is a partial order of the set C of candidates
representing the partial ranking (partial preference) of
voter vj on the candidates. A completion of a partial vot-
ing profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) is a complete voting profile
T = (T1, . . . , Tn) such that each Ti is a completion of
the partial order Pi. The notions of necessary and possible
winners were introduced by Konczak and Lang [14].
Let r be a voting rule and P a partial voting profile.
The set NW(r, P) of the necessary winners with respect
to r and P is the intersection of the sets W(r,T), where
T varies over all completions of P. In other words, a
candidate c is a necessary winnerwith respect to r and P,
if c is a winner in W(r,T) for every completion T of P.
The set PW(r, P) of the possible winnerswith respect to
r and P is the union of the sets W(r,T), where T varies
over all completions of P. In other words, a candidate
c is a possible winner with respect to r and P, if c is a
winner in W(r,T) for at least one completion T of P.
On the face of the definitions, computing necessary
and possible winners requires exponential time, since,
in general, a partial ordermay have exponentially many
completions. There is a substantial body of research on
the computational complexity of the necessary and the
possible winners for a variety of voting rules. The fol-
lowing complete classification of the complexity of the
necessary and the possible winners for all pure posi-
tional scoring rules was obtained through the work of
Konczak and Lang [14], Xia and Conitzer [21], Betzler
and Dorn [4], and Baumeister and Rothe [3].
Theorem 1. [Classification Theorem] The following hold.
• For every pure positional scoring rule r, there is
a polynomial-time algorithm for computing the set
NW(r, P) of necessary winners, given a partial voting
profile P.
• If r is the plurality rule or r is the veto rule, then there
is a polynomial-time algorithm for computing the set
PW(r, P) of possible winners, given a partial voting pro-
file P. For all other pure positional scoring rules, the fol-
lowing problem is NP-complete: given a partial voting
profile P and a candidate c, is c a possible winner with
respect to r and P?
3 A Relational Framework for COMSOC
Preference schemas and sessions. We adopt and re-
fine the formalism for preference databases proposed
in [10] and explored further in [11]. A preference schema
consists of preference relation symbols and ordinary rela-
tion symbols. The attribute list of each preference sym-
bol P is of the form (β; Al , Ar), where β is a list of at-
tributes called session signature, and Al , Ar are attributes
with candidates as values. The intent is that if (b; c, d) is
a tuple in an instance of the preference symbol P, then
candidate c is preferred to candidate d in the session
determined by b. In what follows, we will assume that
each session signature β consists of the attributes elec-
tion and voter. The intuition is that values for election
stand for particular events, such as an election (e.g., the
election for city council members) or a poll (e.g., a poll
on presidential candidates taken on October 5), while
the values for voter range over the possible voters.
Incorporating voting rules and winners. We aug-
ment the preference schema at hand with a new ternary
relation symbol WINNER. The signature of WINNER is
the triple (rule, election, candidate). The intent is that
rule has voting rules as values, while election and can-
didate have elections (or polls) and candidates as val-
ues, respectively. The new relation symbol WINNER
can now be used in standard relational database queries
(e.g., SQL queries). To illustrate this, we return to our
running example (the preference database in Fig. 1) and
give examples of Boolean queries over this database.
• Query q1: Is there a winner according to the plural-
ity rule in the October 5 election who is pro-choice?
q1() :−WINNER(plurality,Oct-5, c),
SUPPORTS(c,pro-choice)
• Query q2: Are there a winner according to the
Borda rule and a winner according to the 2-
approval rule such that the former supports gun
control and the latter opposes it?
q2() :−WINNER(Borda,Oct-5, c),
WINNER(2-approval,Oct-5, d),
SUPPORTS(c,gun-control),
OPPOSES(d,gun-control)
Necessary and possible answers. What is the seman-
tics of queries, such as the three preceding ones, in
a framework that allows for partial preferences, vot-
ing rules, and winners? We propose two different se-
mantics of queries over partial preference databases,
namely, the necessary answers and the possible answers.
Let D be a partial preference database. Then D gives
rise to a partial voting profile P(D) consisting of the
partial orders that correspond to the identifiers of the
session signature. For example, the pair (Oct-5,Ann)
gives rise to the partial order that expresses the (partial)
preferences of Ann in the October 5 election (or poll).
Let D̂ be a total preference database. We say that D̂ is
a completion of D if D̂ is obtained from D by completing
all partial preferences into total ones. Thus, D̂ is a com-
pletion of D iff D̂ and D agree on the ordinary relation
symbols and, for each preference relation symbol, the
total voting profile T(D̂) arising from D̂ is a completion
of the partial voting profile P(D) arising from D.
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Definition 1. Let q be a database query over the prefer-
ence schema augmentedwith relation symbol WINNER.
• The necessary answers of q on D, denoted NA(q,D),
is the intersection
⋂
q(D̂) of the answers q(D̂) of q
on D̂, as D̂ ranges over all completions of D.
• The possible answers of q on D, denoted PA(q,D), is
the union
⋃
q(D̂) of the answers q(D̂) of q on D̂, as
D̂ ranges over all completions of D.
If q contains an atom of the form WINNER(r, e, c),
then this atom is evaluated on D̂ by applying the vot-
ing rule r on the total voting profile T(D̂). Thus,
WINNER(r, e, c) evaluates to true on D̂ if and only if c
belongs to the set W(r,T(D̂)) of the winners according
to rule r and the total voting profile T(D̂). In this eval-
uation, only the part of the voting profile T(D̂) that is
associated with the election e is needed.
Clearly, the preceding notions of necessary and pos-
sible answers coincide with those of certain and possi-
ble answers in the framework of incomplete databases,
where the setW of possible worlds is the set of all com-
pletions D̂ of a given partial preference database D.
If q is a Boolean query, we say that q is necessary on
D if q(D̂) is true for every completion D̂, and possible
on D if q(D̂) is true for at least one completion D̂. We
denote by Necessity(q) the decision problem: given D, is
q necessary on D? Similarly, we denote by Possibility(q)
the decision problem: given D, is q possible on D?
We conclude this section by pointing out that our
framework is different from other approaches that have
explored the interaction between databases and so-
cial choice. For example, Konczak [13] investigated
the computation of necessary and possible winners via
logic programming (however, that work does not in-
volve the concepts of necessary answers and possi-
ble answers of queries considered here). In a differ-
ent direction, Lukasiewicz et al. [18] investigated top-
k queries in databases using rankings whose computa-
tion involve the aggregation of partial preferences.
4 Complexity of Necessary Answers
How difficult is it to compute the necessary answers
and the possible answers of a fixed conjunctive query q,
given a partial preference database D? As regards up-
per bounds, we can consider every candidate tuple of
values from the domain of D, and test whether this tu-
ple is indeed a necessary or possible answer. If the vot-
ing rules occurring in q are such that their winners are
computable in polynomial time, then, for every comple-
tion D̂ ofD, we have that q(D̂) can be evaluated in poly-
nomial time in the size of D̂. Consequently, deciding
whether a tuple is a necessary answer of q is in coNP,
while deciding whether it is possible is in NP.
Here, we will investigate the computational complex-
ity of the necessary answers of conjunctive queries. We
begin by considering several motivating examples.
Example 1. Assume that q is an atomic query of the
form WINNER(r, e, c). Computing the necessary and
the possible answers of q is the same as computing the
necessary and the possible winners according to rule
r. Thus, if r is a pure positional scoring rule, then this
query is accounted for by the Classification Theorem 1
discussed earlier.
Example 2. Let q be the query q1 encountered earlier:
q1() :−WINNER(plurality,Oct-5, c),
SUPPORTS(c,pro-choice)
A moment’s reflection reveals that there is a difference
between the problem of deciding whether q is possible
and the problem of deciding whether q is necessary.
Indeed, to determine whether q1 is possible on a par-
tial preference database D, it is enough to compute
the set PW(plurality, P(D)) of the possible winners
with respect to the plurality rule and the partial vot-
ing profile P(D), and then intersect this set with the set
of the pro-choice candidates. Since the possible win-
ners with respect to the plurality rule are computable in
polynomial time, it follows that Possibility(q1) is decid-
able in polynomial time.
In other words, the possibility of q1 can be rewrit-
ten to a query that involves the possible winners
PW(plurality,T(D)). Concretely, Possibility(q1) is
equivalent to the query
q′1() :− (c IN PW(plurality,T(D))),
SUPPORTS(c,pro-choice) .
In contrast, Necessity(q1) cannot be rewritten (at least
in a straightforward way) to a computation involving
the necessary winners NW(plurality,T(D)). In par-
ticular, Necessity(q1) is not equivalent to the query
q′′1 () :− (c IN NW(plurality,T(D))),
SUPPORTS(c,pro-choice) .
Indeed, for every completion D̂ of D, there may ex-
ist a pro-choice winner (thus, q1 is necessary on D),
but there may be different winners for different com-
pletions and, as a result, there may exist no necessary
winner who is also pro-choice (thus, the query q′′1 eval-
uates to false on D).
Our results, however, will imply that Necessity(q1) is
decidable in PTIME.
Example 3. Assume that q is the query q3: Are there two
winners with different positions on at least one issue?
q3() :−WINNER(plurality, e, c), SUPPORTS(c, i),
WINNER(plurality, e, d), OPPOSES(d, i)
Note that the query q3 involves two WINNER atoms and
that the candidates c and d occurring in these atoms are
linked via the variable i in the two ordinary atoms of q3.
Our results will imply that Necessity(q3) is coNP-
complete. Thus, Examples 2 and 3 demonstrate that,
when bringing together preferences, voting rules, and
relational data in a unifying framework, we are in a new
state of affairs in which methods and results from com-
putational social choice need not apply directly.
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4.1 Complexity Results for the Plurality Rule
We present several complexity results for Boolean con-
junctive queries. In what follows in this subsection, we
assume that all queries considered involve the plurality
rule and some fixed election, which appears as a con-
stant value elec in the queries. Hence, each WINNER
atom has at most one variable, which stands for a win-
ning candidate; we refer to such variable as a winner
variable.
Tractability Results
We begin with a tractability result.
Theorem 2. If q is a Boolean conjunctive query consist-
ing of a single WINNER atom and ordinary atoms, then
Necessity(q) is decidable in polynomial time.
Next, we prove Theorem 2. Let q be as in the theo-
rem. For a voting rule r, the evaluation of q reduces to
the following problem that we refer to as necessary in-
tersection: Given a set C of candidates, a partial voting
profile P and a party A ⊆ C, is A represented in the
winners in every completion of P? In other words, is it
true thatW(r,T) ∩ A 6= ∅ for all completions T of P?
In the remainder of this proof, we present an algo-
rithm for necessary intersection in the case where r is
the plurality rule.
We assume that C = {c1, . . . , cm} and P =
(P1, . . . , Pn). For every Pi, we denote by max(Pi) the set
of candidates c such that Pi does not prefer any other
candidate over c. For each candidate cj, let mj be the
number of partial profiles Pi such that cj ∈ max(Pi).
The following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 1. For all j it holds that mj is the maximal score that
cj can obtain over all possible completions of P.
We select cq ∈ C \ A as a candidate outside of A such
that mq is maximal among all candidates in C \ A. A
key lemma is the following.
Lemma 2. For all completions U of P there exists a
completion U′ of P such that score(U′, cq) = mq and
score(U′, a) ≤ score(U, a) for all a ∈ A.
Proof. Let U be a completion of P. Transform U into U′
by promoting cq to the head of the list whenever cq ∈
max(Pi). Then the score of cq in U
′ is mq. Moreover, by
transforming U to U′ no candidate a ∈ A got any new
point of score.
We then conclude the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The following are equivalent.
1. There is a completion of P such that no party member is
a winner.
2. There is a completionT of P such that score(T, a) < mq
for all a ∈ A.
Proof. We prove each direction separately.
1 ⇒ 2 : Let T be a completion of P such that no
candidate in A is a winner. Let ce be a winner of T.
Then score(T, ce) > score(T, a) for all a ∈ A. According
to Lemma 1 it holds that me ≥ score(T, ce), and hence,
mq > score(T, a) for all a ∈ A. So, we select as T the
completion U′ of Lemma 2 for U = T.
2 ⇒ 1 : Suppose that T is a completion of P such
that score(T, a) < mq for all a ∈ A. Let T′ be obtained
from T by applying Lemma 2, where T plays the role of
U and T′ the role of U′. Then in T′ every party member
of A has a score strictly lower than cq, and therefore,
none of the members of A are winners.
From Lemma 3 we conclude that we need to decide
on the existence of a completion T of P such that each
party member a ∈ A has a score lower than mq. This
is done by translating the problem into that of finding a
maximum matching in a bipartite graph, as follows.
Call a partial profile Pi a necessary supporter of A
if max(Pi) ⊆ A. We construct the bipartite graph
G(U,V, E) as follows.
• U contains the node i for every necessary supporter
Pi of A.
• V contains the nodes 〈a, 1〉, . . . , 〈a,mq − 1〉 for all
party members a ∈ A.
• E connects i ∈ U with 〈a, j〉 ∈ V whenever a ∈
max(Pi).
Lemma 4. The following are equivalent.
1. There is a completionT of P such that score(T, a) < mq
for all a ∈ A.
2. G has a matching of size |U|.
Proof. We prove each direction separately.
1 ⇒ 2 : Let T be a completion of P such that
score(U, a) < mq for all a ∈ A. We construct a matching
in G by selecting for each i a unique 〈a, j〉where a is the
top of Ti. Observe that we have enough 〈a, j〉 since a got
fewer top votes than mq, as we are using the plurality
rule.
2 ⇒ 1 : Suppose that G has a matching of size |U|.
We construct the desired T as follows. For each nec-
essary supporter Pi, if i is matched with 〈a, j〉 then we
select as Ti a completion in which a is at the top. For
every other Pi we select as Ti a completion in which a
candidate in C \ A is at the top. Hence, each a ∈ A gets
the a score smaller than mq since there are only mq − 1
pairs 〈a, j〉.
To conclude, our algorithm computes mq, constructs
the graph G, and answers “yes” if and only if G has
no matching of size |U|. The correctness is due to the
combination of Lemmas 3 and 4. This completes the
proof of Theorem 2.
As a direct corollary of Theorem 2, for the query q1
in Example 2, we have that Necessity(q1) is in polyno-
mial time. Another corollary, discussed next, general-
izes Theorem 2 through the notion of the Gaifman graph
of a query, a notion that plays an important role in finite
model theory (see [16]); in this graph, the nodes are the
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variables of the query and the edges consist of pairs of
variables occurring in the same ordinary atom.
The corollary applies to the case where every two
distinct winner variables belong to different connected
components of the Gaifman graph. In this case, we say
that the WINNER atoms are pairwise disconnected.
Corollary 1. If q is a Boolean conjunctive query with
pairwise-disconnected WINNER atoms, then Necessity(q) is
decidable in polynomial time.
Proof. When the winner variables of a Boolean conjunc-
tive query q are pairwise disconnected, the query “fac-
tors out” over the subqueries q′ that correspond to the
connected components of the Gaifman graph. Conse-
quently, q is necessary on D if and only if each q′ is nec-
essary on D. Hence, it suffices to solve Necessity(q′) for
each such q′. Theorem 2 implies that Necessity(q′) can
be solved in polynomial time for each such q′ since, by
assumption, each such q′ contains either:
• one WINNER atom, in which case it covered by
Theorem 2;
• several copies of a WINNER atom, in which we can
ignore all of these atoms except for one copy; or
• no WINNER atoms at all, in which case the evalua-
tion is that of a conjunctive query over an ordinary
database.
Hence,Necessity(q) is decidable in polynomial time.
Dichotomy for TwoWINNER Atoms
Next, we show that, for a natural class of conjunctive
queries, the necessity of queries exhibit a PTIME vs.
coNP-complete dichotomy.
Definition 2. Let C2W be the class of all Boolean con-
junctive queries q with the following properties:
(i) There are two distinct WINNER atoms (and both
involve the plurality rule and the same fixed election).
(ii) All other atoms of q are ordinary atoms such that
no ordinary relation symbol occurs twice (i.e., the ordi-
nary atoms form a self-join free query).
Theorem 3. Let q be a query in the class C2W.
• If the WINNER atoms of q are pairwise disconnected,
then Necessity(q) is decidable in polynomial time.
• Otherwise, Necessity(q) is coNP-complete.
In the remainder of this section, we prove Theorem 3.
We begin by proving coNP-hardness ofNecessity(qh) for
a specific Boolean conjunctive query qh:
qh() :−WINNER(plurality,elec, c), R(c, d), (1)
WINNER(plurality,elec, d)
Lemma 5. Necessity(qh) is coNP-complete.
Proof. Membership in coNP is straightforward: as a
witness of non-necessity, we can use an appropriate
completion of the partial preferences. To prove coNP-
hardness, we show a reduction from the complement of
the maximum independent set problem. We are given as
input a graph g and a number k, and the goal is to de-
termine whether g has an independent set of size k. We
construct a database as follows.
• There is a single election, and the candidates are al
pairs of the form 〈u, i〉 where u is a node of g and
1 ≤ i ≤ k.
• There are k voters v1, . . . , vk. The voter vi prefers
every candidate 〈u, i〉 to all candidates 〈u′, i′〉
where i′ 6= i. Voter vi has no preference between
the 〈u, i〉.
• R consists of all pairs (〈u, i〉, 〈u′, i′〉) such that one
of the following holds:
– u = u′ and i 6= i′;
– u 6= u′ but u is a neighbor of u′.
This concludes the reduction, and we complete the
proof by proving its correctness.
We have the following. If g has an independent set
U = {u1, . . . , uk} of size k, then we construct a comple-
tion D̂ of D such that qh(D̂) is false. For that, the voter
vi positions 〈ui, i〉 first. Then, the winners are the 〈ui, i〉,
and then qh(D̂) is indeed false. Similarly, if qh is false in
a completion, then the set of winners in this completion
forms an independent set of size k.
We can now prove Theorem 3.
Proof (of Theorem 3). Tractability follows from Corol-
lary 1. For coNP-hardness, we use the coNP-hardness
of qh, due to Lemma 5, and reduce qh to each remaining
query via the proof technique of a dichotomy by Kenig
et al. [11]. We do so as follows.
Let q be a conjunctive query in C2W such that the
WINNER atoms of q are connected. We write q as fol-
lows.
q() :−WINNER(plurality,elec, c) ,
WINNER(plurality,elec, d) ,
ϕ(c, d, x1, . . . , xk)
Here, ϕ(c, d, x1, . . . , xk) is a conjunction of distinct
atomic queries, all ordinary database relations. We con-
struct a reduction from qh to q. That is, given a database
Dh for qh , we construct a database D for q, so that the
two queries q and qh are either both necessary or none
is.
Let Dh be given. To construct D, we use the exact
same partial profile as Dh, and we construct the other
relations of ϕ as follows. We begin with empty rela-
tions. For each fact R(a, b) ofDh, we add toD all ground
facts of ϕ(a, b, ..., b).
To prove correctness, we show that for every comple-
tion of the profile, the two queries behave the same. For
that, we show two claims:
1. If R(a, b) is in Dh, then ϕ(a, b, ..., b) is true in D.
2. If ϕ(a, b, b1, ..., bk) is true in D for some b1, . . . , bk,
then R(a, b) is in Dh.
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The first claim is true by construction, and it requires
neither the assumption that ϕ connects the winners nor
that q has no self joins.
For the second claim, assume that ϕ(a, b, b1, ..., bk) is
true in D for some b1, . . . , bk. If c and d occur in the
same atom, then it follows immediately that R(a, b) is
in Dh. Otherwise, the variable tuples of the atoms in-
clude three types: ones that involve c and xis, ones
that involve only xis, and ones that involve xis and d.
Then the tuples of the second and the third type have
the property that they give rise to reflexive tuples in D,
where values that correspond to different variables are
the same. By connectedness, we get the existence of an
atom of the first type, in which c takes the value a and
xi takes value b. This can only happen if we had R(c, d)
in Dh. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
As a direct application, Necessity(q3) is coNP-
complete, where q3 is the query in Example 3. In
contrast, Necessity(q4) is solvable in polynomial time,
where q4 is the following query.
q4() :−WINNER(plurality,elec, c),
WINNER(plurality,elec, d),
SUPPORTS(c,pro-choice), CAND(d, p,BS, a).
4.2 Hardness Beyond the Plurality Rule
A positional scoring rule r is said to be strict if always
allows to strictly prefer one candidate over another, or
more formally, it is the case that r(m, 1) > r(m,m) for
all m > 1. In this section, we show the existence of
a Boolean conjunctive query q such that Necessity(q) is
coNP-complete for all strict positional scoring rules.1
If r is a positional scoring rule, then we denote by qr
3w
the following query that uses r as a constant.
qr
3w
() :−WINNER(r, e, x1), WINNER(r, e, x2), (2)
WINNER(r, e, x3), R(x1, x2, x3)
Theorem 4. Necessity(qr
3w
) is coNP-complete for all strict
positional scoring rules r.
In the remainder of this section, we prove Theorem 4.
We show a reduction from 3-DNF Tautology. An in-
stance of this problem is a 3-DNF formula ϕ = ψ1 ∨
· · · ∨ ψk over a collection x1, . . . , xℓ of Boolean variables,
where each ψi is a conjunction of three atomic formulas.
The goal is to determine whether ϕ is true fo every truth
assignment to x1, . . . , xℓ. So, let r be a strict scoring rule,
and let such ϕ be given. We construct an instance of qr
3w
as follows.
There are 2ℓ+ 1 candidates:
• xi for i = 1, . . . , ℓ;
• ¬xi for i = 1, . . . , ℓ;
1We note that this result subsumes the corresponding re-
sults, namely Theorems 4 and 5, that we have published in
the abridged version of this paper [12]. Specifically, our re-
sults there are restricted to the classes of eventually constant
and k-veto rules.
• a special candidate x0.
We denote by C the set of all candidates; that is:
C = {x0, x1,¬x1, x2,¬x2, . . . , xℓ,¬xℓ} .
We denote by m the number |C| of candidates, that is,
m = 2ℓ + 1. It is crucial for the proof that m is odd,
and this is the reason for having the special candidate
x0. We fix a natural number d ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}with the
property that
r(m, d) > r(m, d+ 1) .
We identify a linear order over C with a vector c =
(c1, . . . , cm) that consists of all the candidates of C,
where c1 is the most preferred and cm is the least pre-
ferred. For i = 1, . . . , ℓ, let ci be the vector (linear order)
that is constructed as follows. Start with a vector of m
empty placeholders. Next, place xi at position d and
¬xi at position d + 1. Next, place all remaining m − 2
elements at the remaining m− 2 placeholders, in an ar-
bitrary order. We denote ci as follows.
ci = (c1, . . . , cd−1, xi,¬xi, cd, . . . , cm−2)
For i = 1, . . . , ℓ, we define m− 2 voters as follows.
• The voter vi has the preference c
i, with the pref-
erence xi > ¬xi removed. Hence, xi and ¬xi are
incomparable, but inserting either the preference
xi > ¬xi or the preference ¬xi > xi results in a
linear order.
• For an odd j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 3}, the voter v
j
i has the
total preference order ci, with all candidates but xi
and ¬xi shifted j positions to the left in a circular
manner; that is:
(c′1, . . . , c
′
d−1, xi,¬xi, c
′
d, . . . , c
′
m−2)
where (c′1, . . . , c
′
m−2) = (c1+j, . . . , cm−2, c1, . . . , cj).
• For an even j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 3}, the voter v
j
i has the
same preference as an odd j, except that xi and ¬xi
switch positions; that is:
(c′1, . . . , c
′
d−1,¬xi, xi, c
′
d, . . . , c
′
m−2)
where (c′1, . . . , c
′
m−2) = (c1+j, . . . , cm−2, c1, . . . , cj).
Taken over all i = 1, . . . , ℓ, the above defines ℓ(m− 2)
voters.
Denote the sequence (x1,¬x1, x2,¬x2, . . . , xℓ,¬xℓ) as
(c′′1 , . . . , c
′′
m−1). We define additional m − 1 voters
u1, . . . , um−1, where the preference for uj is the linear
order (c′′1 , . . . , c
′′
m−1, x0) with c
′′
1 , . . . , c
′′
m−1 shifted j posi-
tions to the left in a circular manner; that is, the prefer-
ence of uj is given by the following vector.
(c′′j+1, . . . , c
′′
m−1, c
′′
1 , . . . , c
′′
j , x0)
This completes our definition of the voters. All in all,
we have precisely ℓ(m − 2) + m − 1 voters; we denote
this number by n
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Table 1: Example of voters for the variables x1, x2 and x3 and d = 3
Voter Partial order
v11 x2 > ¬x2 > x1 > ¬x1 > x3 > ¬x3 > x0
v21 ¬x2 > x3 > ¬x1 > x1 > ¬x3 > x0 > x2
v31 x3 > ¬x3 > x1 > ¬x1 > x0 > x2 > ¬x2
v41 ¬x3 > x0 > ¬x1 > x1 > x2 > ¬x2 > x3
v1 x0 > x2 > {x1,¬x1} > ¬x2 > x3 > ¬x3
v12 x1 > ¬x1 > x2 > ¬x2 > x3 > ¬x3 > x0
v22 ¬x1 > x3 > ¬x2 > x2 > ¬x3 > x0 > x1
v32 x3 > ¬x3 > x2 > ¬x2 > x0 > x1 > ¬x1
v42 ¬x3 > x0 > ¬x2 > x2 > x1 > ¬x1 > x3
v2 x0 > x1 > {x2,¬x2} > ¬x1 > x3 > ¬x3
v13 x1 > ¬x1 > x3 > ¬x3 > x2 > ¬x2 > x0
v23 ¬x1 > x2 > ¬x3 > x3 > ¬x2 > x0 > x1
v33 x2 > ¬x2 > x3 > ¬x3 > x0 > x1 > ¬x1
v43 ¬x2 > x0 > ¬x3 > x3 > x1 > ¬x1 > x2
v3 x0 > x1 > {x3,¬x3} > ¬x1 > x2 > ¬x2
u1 x1 > ¬x1 > x2 > ¬x2 > x3 > ¬x3 > x0
u2 ¬x1 > x2 > ¬x2 > x3 > ¬x3 > x1 > x0
u3 x2 > ¬x2 > x3 > ¬x3 > x1 > ¬x1 > x0
u4 ¬x2 > x3 > ¬x3 > x1 > ¬x1 > x2 > x0
u5 x3 > ¬x3 > x1 > ¬x1 > x2 > ¬x2 > x0
u6 ¬x3 > x1 > ¬x1 > x2 > ¬x2 > x3 > x0
For a completion T = (T1, . . . , Tn) of our partial pro-
file, let us say that T selects xi if the completion of vi
prefers xi to ¬xi, and ¬xi if the completion of vi prefers
¬xi to xi. The key lemma of the proof is the following.
Lemma 6. For every completion T, the winners are precisely
the atomic formulas selected T.
Proof. Let T be a completion, let p ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, and let
a ∈ {xp ,¬xp} be an atomic formula. Let us compute
the score s(T, a) that T assignes to a.
• For i 6= p, the voters vi and v
1
i , . . . , v
m−3
i jointly con-
tribute to the score of a the following portion that
we denote by ρ.
ρ =
(
m
∑
i=1
r(m, i)
)
− r(m, d)− r(m, d+ 1) (3)
This is true because in the orders defined by
v1i , . . . , v
m−3
i , the atom a appears precisely once in
each position, except for the positions d and d+ 1.
• The voter vp contributes to a the following portion
that we determine by σa.
σa =
{
r(m, d) if T selects a;
r(m, d+ 1) otherwise.
(4)
In particular, σa > σa′ if a is selected and a
′ is not.
• The voters v1p, . . . , v
m−3
p jointly contribute to the
score a the following portion.
m− 3
2
· r(m, d) +
m− 3
2
· r(m, d+ 1) =
(ℓ− 1)(r(m, d) + r(m, d+ 1)) (5)
Here, we are using the fact that m is odd, which is
again due to the addition of x0.
• The voters u1, . . . , um−1 jointly contribute to the
score of a the following portion.
m−1
∑
i=1
r(m, i) (6)
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All in all, the score s(T, a) that a gains in T sums up to
s(T, a) =(ℓ− 1)ρ + σa + (ℓ− 1)(r(m, d) + r(m, d+ 1))
+
m−1
∑
i=1
r(m, i) . (7)
In particular, we conclude that the score is determined
only by whether a is selected or not, and every selected
candidate has a higher score than every non-selected
candidate.
To complete the proof, we need to show x0 does not
have a score higher than the selected a. We will show
that score s(T, x0) is lower than s(T, a) for every atomic
formula a, selected or not. First, let us compute s(T, x0).
For i = 1, . . . , ℓ, the voters vi and v
1
i , . . . , v
ℓ
i jointly con-
tribute to x0 the portion ρ, and so, over all i we get ℓ · ρ.
The voters u1, . . . , uℓ jointly contribute to the score of x0
the portion (m − 1) · r(m,m). Hence, we have the fol-
lowing.
s(T, x0) = ℓ · ρ + (m− 1) · r(m,m) (8)
Hence, combining (7) and (8) we get the following for
all atomic formulas a.
s(T, a)− s(T, x0) = −ρ + σa + (ℓ− 1)(r(m, d)
+ r(m, d+ 1)) +
(
m−1
∑
i=1
r(m, i)
)
− (m− 1) · r(m,m)
= −
(
m
∑
i=1
r(m, i)
)
+ r(m, d) + r(m, d+ 1) + σa
+ (ℓ− 1)(r(m, d) + r(m, d+ 1))
+
(
m−1
∑
i=1
r(m, i)
)
− (m− 1) · r(m,m)
= −r(m,m) + σa + ℓ(r(m, d) + r(m, d+ 1))
− (m− 1) · r(m,m)
= σa + ℓ(r(m, d) + r(m, d+ 1))−m · r(m,m)
> r(m, d+ 1) + ℓ(r(m, d+ 1)
+ r(m, d+ 1))−m · r(m,m)
= m · r(m, d+ 1)−m · r(m,m) ≥ 0
Hence, s(T, a) − s(T, x0) > 0, as claimed. This com-
pletes the proof of the lemma.
We complete the proof by defining the ternary rela-
tion R. Recall that ϕ = ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψk. For j = 1, . . . , k, let
ψj = a
1
j ∨ a
2
j ∨ a
3
j ; we insert into R the triple (a
1
j , a
2
j , a
3
j ).
In particular, R contains k tuples. Based on Lemma 6,
the query qr
3w
is true in a completion if and only if the
winners (i.e., the selected atomic formulas) represent a
satisfying assignment. Hence, the query qr
3w
is neces-
sary if and only if ϕ is a tautology. This completes the
proof of Theorem 4.
5 Concluding Remarks
We presented a framework that enriches social choice
with relational database context. This framework sup-
ports the formulation of queries about winners in elec-
tions, alongside contextual information about candi-
dates, voters, and positions on issues. In the presence of
incomplete voter preferences, the semantics of queries
are given via the notions of necessary and possible an-
swers, which extend the notions of necessary and pos-
sible winners. Our technical results about the necessary
answers of conjunctive queries reveal that the context
makes a substantial difference, since the complexity of
the necessary answers of queries may be higher than
the complexity of the necessary winners.
It remains open to determine the complexity of the
possible answers for the plurality rule and the veto rule
(for all other positional scoring rules, even computing
the possible winners is an intractable problem). It is in-
teresting to go beyond conjunctive queries and, among
others, consider queries that support aggregate opera-
tors, such as count and average.
The alternativemodeling of preferences is another di-
rection for future research. Probabilistic votes adopt
statistical models of preferences, such as Mallows [19]
and the Repeated Insertion Model (RIM) [6]. The ana-
log of computing necessary/possible winners is to com-
pute the probability that a given candidate wins [2;
17]. In our framework, the analog is probabilistic query
answering, where the goal is to compute the marginal
probability of possible query answers [5; 20]. Con-
junctive query evaluation over RIM databases has been
studied in [11], but without the angle of computational
social choice.
The modeling of voter preferences may also incorpo-
rate constraints (or dependencies) that restrict the possible
completions to those satisfying some conditions that are
known to hold. An example is that voters vote accord-
ing to party affiliation—all candidates of one party are
preferred to all candidates of another party (but we do
not know upfront which party comes first).
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